Afghanistan: The War Without An Exit
FROM THE SOUTHERN AIR IMPORT // INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS · NOVEMBER 1986
AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR WITHOUT AN EXIT
Moscow's Promises Of Withdrawal Meet The Reality Of A Continuing Conflict
November 1986 — Foreign Affairs Desk
Nearly seven years after Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, the conflict continues to impose a considerable military and political burden upon Moscow. Despite recent announcements suggesting a reduction in Soviet troop commitments, there is little indication that the fighting is approaching a decisive conclusion.
The Soviet Union has invested substantial manpower and equipment in support of the government in Kabul. Its forces remain responsible for major combat operations, the protection of strategic installations and the security of important supply routes. Yet the Afghan resistance continues to operate across large portions of the countryside, making the maintenance of government authority an expensive and difficult undertaking.
A WITHDRAWAL IN QUESTION
The announcement of a Soviet troop withdrawal has attracted considerable international attention. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev previously indicated that six Soviet regiments would be withdrawn, presenting the measure as evidence of Moscow's willingness to reduce its military involvement.
However, an intelligence assessment dated November 7 raises serious questions about the military significance of the withdrawal.
According to the assessment, Soviet forces introduced replacement formations and equipment into Afghanistan before the withdrawal ceremonies. Some of the units subsequently removed had reportedly been deployed specifically to make the reduction appear more substantial.
Western observers have therefore questioned whether the withdrawal represents a meaningful reduction in Soviet combat strength or primarily a diplomatic gesture.
The distinction is important. A genuine reduction in Soviet forces could affect the balance of the conflict, while a limited reorganization would leave the fundamental military situation largely unchanged.
THE CHANGING AIR WAR
Mi-24 gunships cover Soviet armor in an Afghan valley. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1984.
One of the most significant developments in the conflict has been the increasing vulnerability of Soviet and Afghan government aircraft.
The introduction of American-supplied shoulder-fired Stinger missiles has created new difficulties for Soviet helicopter and fixed-wing operations.
These weapons provide resistance forces with a portable means of engaging aircraft that previously operated with considerable freedom over much of the countryside.
The implications are substantial. Helicopters have been particularly important to Soviet operations, providing transportation, reconnaissance, fire support and rapid reinforcement in areas inaccessible to conventional ground formations.
Any reduction in their freedom of operation increases the difficulty of maintaining isolated garrisons and protecting supply convoys.
The improved capabilities of the resistance have also encouraged greater caution among Soviet aviation units, which must now consider the possibility of missile engagement during routine operations.
KABUL'S POLITICAL FUTURE
The political situation is changing alongside the military campaign.
Mohammad Najibullah, who assumed leadership of the Afghan government earlier this year, has sought to strengthen the administration through political reorganization and attempts at national reconciliation.
Former leader Babrak Karmal has been removed from the largely ceremonial position of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. On November 24, Haji Mohammad Chamkani succeeded him.
The changes are intended to demonstrate a willingness to broaden the political character of the government and reduce its dependence upon the existing ruling party.
Nevertheless, the resistance has shown little enthusiasm for accepting a settlement under the present administration.
The United Nations General Assembly has also continued to press for a negotiated resolution. On November 5, it adopted a resolution calling for a political settlement and the withdrawal of foreign forces.
THE COST OF CONTINUING
For Moscow, Afghanistan represents a difficult calculation.
Continued military involvement carries financial and political costs, while an abrupt departure risks undermining the government it has spent years supporting.
The resistance, meanwhile, has little incentive to accept a settlement that leaves the existing government in power.
The result is a conflict in which neither side has demonstrated an ability to secure a decisive conclusion.
For international observers, the most important question is no longer whether Moscow recognizes the cost of the war, but whether it can arrange an exit without surrendering its political investment in Kabul.
THE IMPORT VERDICT: Afghanistan remains a major test of Soviet military logistics. The ability to sustain forces across difficult terrain, protect supply routes and maintain air superiority will remain central to the conflict. The announced withdrawals should be treated cautiously until accompanied by measurable reductions in operational strength.
SOURCES AND CONTEMPORARY REFERENCE MATERIAL: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Developments in Afghanistan,” November 7, 1986; United Nations General Assembly proceedings, November 5, 1986.
FROM THE MANIFEST
CIA ASSESSMENT: NOV. 7, 1986 · UN RESOLUTION: NOV. 5, 1986 · SOUTHERN AIR IMPORT · NOVEMBER 1986 · DEPT. 9
SOUTHERN AIR TRADE // THE MANIFEST